
Developing a Secure
Medical Research
Workspace
Michael Shoffner
Phil Owen
Xiaoshu Wang
renci
RESEARCH ENGAGEMENT INNOVATION

# Collaborators





# Team

- Javed Mostafa (PI – SILS, NC TraCS)
- Charles Schmitt (RENCI)
- Brent Lamm (NC TraCS)
- Michael Shoffner (RENCI)
- Phil Owen (RENCI)
- Xiaoshu Wang (RENCI)
- Casey Averill (RENCI)
- Ray Diorio (NC TraCS)
- Ken Langley (SOM)
- Erik Scott (RENCI)

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# Drivers

- Protected Health Information (PHI) data must always be protected.

- Lack of a security solution for working with PHI impedes medical and translational research.

# Vision (I)

Provide convenient, secure access to PHI CDW-H for UNC healthcare professionals and researchers.




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# Vision (II)

Produce a model system plan and architecture for dissemination.

photo: guy schmidt

# Vision (III)

- Maintain a testbed for ongoing development
  - In partnership with NC TraCS, SOM, ISD, and ITS.

# Strategy

- "Defense in Depth" philosophy
- Development
  - Prefer COTS/vendor solutions
  - Integrate (limited) custom code
- Track ongoing security research
- Test, test, and test again

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# Security Landscape




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# Definitions

- **Data Leakage**: *Unauthorized* transmission of data from within an organization to an external destination or recipient.
  - Unauthorized ≠ Intentional or malicious
  - Unintentional or inadvertent leakage is also unauthorized




*Infowatch.com: Global Data Leakage Report 2009*

# Types of Leaked Data

- Private identifiable information (PII)
  - Private but not secretive
  - Examples: SSN, Patient's medical billing code
- Intellectual Property
  - Things of secretive nature
  - Example: source code, design, pricing information




*Infowatch.com: Global Data Leakage Report 2009*

# Leakage by Channels




*Infowatch.com: Global Data Leakage Report 2009*

# Leakage by Channel/Intent




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# Counter Measures




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# DLP Channels




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# Network DLP

- Bridge-based
  - Inspected at the packet level
  - Protocol agnostic
  - Ineffective b/c limited action
- Proxy-based
  - Message queued at proxy for inspection
  - Respond properly according to different protocols
  - Integrates with existing web gateway via iCAP

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# Discovery DLP

- Scan sensitive data on
  - Servers
  - Databases
  - File servers
  - SAN and NAS
- Server or Agent based
- Discovery DLP is not just a scan, it can react according to predefined policies

# Endpoint DLP

- Enforces policies at the endpoint
- Monitors and prevents data movement to common vectors
- Endpoint DLP plugs into OS kernel to monitor
  - File movement
  - Copy/paste
  - Printing
  - Etc.

# DLP Method

- Understand
  - Data transportation protocols
  - Data formats
  - Encryption/Decryption techniques
- Algorithms
  - Keywords
  - Regular Expressions
  - Fingerprinting (Full, partial hash matching)
  - Statistical analysis
  - Conceptual Lexicons

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# Vendors




*Gartner Report: Magic Quadrant of DLP Vendors*

# SMRW Environment and Technology

Objective:

- Provide and facilitate a working environment for researchers that protects sensitive healthcare information.

The workspace environment will provide the researcher with:

- A protected environment.
- Provisioned information gathered from various sources.
- Tools to work with the provisioned data.

The workspace will provide analysts and administrators:

- Security auditing capabilities.
- Research data usage metrics.

# Logical Architecture



# Physical Layout




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# Screenshot – Trend Micro server



# Screenshot – Trend Micro server



# Future Directions

- Automated virtual environment creation capabilities.
- Fabian Monrose (UNC CS)
  - Auditing
  - Security and forensics
- Elisa Bertino (Perdue CS, CERIAS)
  - Security policies

# Wrap-up

- Questions and comments

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